Abstract
Introduction
The formal justice system of Afghanistan has been influenced, to varying degrees, by Western (mainly French) legal thought and moderate Islam, radical Marxism, and by radical interpretations of Islam. These influences, by and large, reflected the values, ideologies, and politics of the various governments that Afghanistan has witnessed since its emergence as a politically organised society. In the 1950s and 1960s, the justice system was modernised and state law, rather than shari'a, became the primary source of the justice system. After the military coup in 1978, the Marxist government 2 attempted to introduce a Soviet-style judicial system, but these changes were rejected before they took root. The subsequent mujahedin regime of 1992-96 declared shari'a as the basis of the state, and this was further entrenched by the taliban's regime.
While most of these regimes have partly used their systems of justice as tools for achieving their political goals, they have nevertheless contributed to the richness of Afghan legal culture; there is much within these different doctrines and approaches that could be fruitfully used and integrated in a post-war justice system.
It is also important to mention that, as the formal Afghan justice system was elitist, corrupt and involved long delays (Wardak 2002a; ICG 2003b) ., many Afghans avoided contacts with it. As a result, many Afghans -particularly in rural areascontinued to use traditional institutions of informal justice such as jirga, maraka, and shura (see footnotes 1 and 2 for a distinction between these concepts). Although the practices of these traditional institutions of popular justice sometimes conflicted with Afghan legal norms and with international standards of human rights, they nevertheless resolved tribal and local conflicts expeditiously and in cost-effective ways (Wardak 2002b) . In this paper, key dimensions of the post-war justice system in Afghanistan are examined. These are: shari'a (Islamic law), traditional informal justice (jirga), 'existing laws' (interim legal framework) and human rights principles. On the basis of an analysis of the interrelationships among these, an experimental integrated model of post-war justice system in Afghanistan is proposed. However, first, it is important to place the subject of examination in this paper in the general context of Afghan society and nearly a quarter of a century of conflict in the country.
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The Afghan Context
Afghanistan is a land-locked country that lies at the crossroad between South and Central Asia. To the North and Northwest of the country lie the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Tajekistan, and Turkmenistan; to the South and East is Pakistan; to the West of Afghanistan lies Iran and to its North-East is China. It is this strategic geo-political location of Afghanistan that has made it both a cross-road between civilizations and a battlefield between competing global and regional powers.
The total population of Afghanistan is estimated to be between 20 -25 million, composed of various ethnic and tribal groups, most of whom have lived together in the country for centuries. These include Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Aimaq, Baluch, Brahui, Nuristani, Pashaie, Pamiri, Kirghiz, Qizilbash, Mongols, Arabs, Gujars, Kohistanis, Wakhis and Jats. Among these, the Pashtuns constitute the largest ethnic group (estimatedly around 50% of the total Afghan population), followed by Tajiks, Hazras and Uzbeks (Dupree 1980; Canfield 1986; Glatzer 1998; Wardak 2003) .
Although these various Afghan groups are generally distinguishable from one another by their members' distinct language (or accent) and ethnic origin, for generations trade and commerce, universities/colleges, government institutions and cross-regional employment opportunities have pulled thousands of Afghans from different ethnic/tribal backgrounds to live and work side by side. Furthermore, inter-marriages, service in the national army and police, and participation in shared cultural, religious and social activities have strengthened citizenship at the expense of ethnic/tribal affiliations in urban centers and cities. This interaction among Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbaks, Turkmen's and other Afghan ethnic and tribal groups has resulted in a cultural fusion among various Afghan ethnic and tribal cultural traditions at the national level. The richness of Afghan national culture owes much to this centuries old multi-cultural fusion.
However, since the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the country has been used as battlefield between competing global and regional powers and groups -a battlefield between the former Communist USSR and the Capitalist West 4 (mainly the USA) in the 1980s; in the 1990s a battlefield between Pakistan, the Arab Gulf countries, on the one hand, and Iran and Russia on the other; and more recently a battlefield between foreign Muslim extremist groups and a right-wing US administration. In this process of rivalry, Afghanistan's main immediate neighbours infiltrated deep into Afghan politics. With competing interests in the country, they created their client factions/warlords and sponsored them militarily, financially and politically. The factions gradually became so dependent on their foreign sponsors that they saw Afghanistan's interests through the eyes of these foreigners. These neighbours also exploited Afghanistan's existing ethnic and religious composition and justified their interventions on the grounds that they had common religious and ethnic ties with their clients. Thus the armed conflict (which continued for several years even after the defeat of the former Red Army) resulted in the extensive destruction of Afghanistan's economic, political and social infrastructure. The Western world, particularly the USA, which lured the Soviets to invade Afghanistan (Brezinzski 1998 , Cooley 2002 , and strongly supported the Afghan mujahedin -Islamic warriorsalmost completely abandoned the ruined country after the Red Army was defeated.
The destruction of the country's economic infrastructure, particularly, provided opportunities for foreign players and their client Afghan warring factions to exploit the situation, seeking their strategic goals and sectarian interests at the expense of the Afghan population. The almost total collapse of the Afghan pre-war economy gradually resulted in the emergence of a 'war economy' (Rubin 1999; Goodhand 2003) -economic conditions that mainly centred on the manufacturing, repair, use and smuggling of weapons and ammunition, on the one hand, and on the smuggling (and production) of illicit drugs and national treasure on the other. The nearly a quarter of a century long conflict also resulted in a generation of young people who were largely deprived of the opportunity of gaining educational qualifications and other useful skills. This 'war generation' of thousands of young people has also been deeply traumatised by the war -many lost their parents, relatives and homes. The various factions were able to recruit their fighters from amongst this war generation, so that the conflict in which they had a stake continued. Fighting for one or other warlord provided these young men with a source of income, social status, and a way of channelling their energies. More importantly, this situation provided the opportunity for foreign Muslim extremist groups -mainly the al-qa'ada -to use Afghan soil as 5 headquarters for terrorist activities against other nations. There now exists an increasingly convincing body of evidence, which links the Afghanistan-based al-qa'ada to the 11 September terrorist attacks on New York's Twin Towers and on other targets in the United States.
In the wake of the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan that resulted in the collapse of the Taliban Shari'a is an Arabic word, which means 'the path to follow'; it is also used to refer to legislation, legitimacy, and legality in modern Arabic literature. However, shari'a in a jurisprudential context means Islamic Law. The primary sources of shari'a are the quran and the sunnah. The first refers to the holy book of Islam, and the second to the statements and deeds of the Prophet Mohammad. However, relatively small portions of the verses of the quran and the contents of the sunnah include legislative material (Lippman et al 1988) . Taken together, the two do not seemingly provide answers to all types of legal issues. However, the quran and the sunnah do lay down general principles as well specific rules that are subject to interpretation and analysis. Thus, after the death of the Prophet Mohammad, the caliphs (leaders of the Muslim community) and the sohaba (the Prophet's associates) appointed consultants to help in the correct interpretation of the quran and the sunnah and in the extraction of rules (for new situations) that seemingly did not exist in the two primary sources of shari'a.
As a result, qiyas and Ijma were added as secondary sources of shari'a.
Qiyas, in the context of Islamic jurisprudence, means analogical reasoning. That is, 7 cases and questions not seemingly answered by the primary sources are deduced from similar original cases in the quran, or in the sunnah through a process of reasoning by analogy. This process was handled only by those Islamic jurists who met strict criteria relating to their knowledge, piety and personal integrity; they were also required to fulfil very strict conditions for the kind of cases that were handled by qiyas.
The fourth source of shari'a, ijma, means the consensus of Islamic jurists on a ruling.
When qualified Islamic jurists reached a unanimous agreement on solution to a specific new problem, their opinion became binding with absolute authority. In this way the outcomes of both qiyas and ijma were transformed into statements of divine law. This has, in turn, resulted in the documentation and compilation of hundreds of cases and books that are used, today, as references in Islamic jurisprudence (Wardak 2003 ). While jami'at -al-ulama members who were paid very handsome salaries endorsed the government policies, the two official madrasas trained students of Islamic theology and jurisprudence as qadi, or state judges.
In the 1950s and 1960s, as Afghanistan's political, economic and cultural relationships increased with the rest of the world, the rulers started to modernise the Afghan justice system in line with those of the Western world. The justice model that Afghan rulers chose to adopt resembled closely the Egyptian model, which was strongly influenced by the French and Ottoman legal systems (Kamali 1985) . In order for the modern Afghan justice system to be run by professional judicial personnel, the 8 faculties of Islamic Law and of Law and Political Science were opened at Kabul University. Thus, the graduates of dar -al-o'lume arabi and abu hanifa were only eligible to work as judges after they had studied modern positive laws as well as that it is only that version of shari'a that is in harmony with Afghan cultural traditions, existing legal norms and fundamental principles of human rights that can make important contributions to a credible post-war justice system in Afghanistan.
II: Customary Law and Jirga
The role of the Afghan central government and its formal institutions of justice (courts, police, corrections etc.) in maintaining social order in Afghan society has always been limited (Wardak 2002a; ICG 2003b) . This particularly applies to rural Afghanistan, where it is estimated that over 80% of the Afghan population live. In some southern and eastern parts of the country, formal institutions of justice have no (or just nominal) existence, and yet there exist a reasonable degree of social order in these areas.
A great many potentially serious disputes, relating to domestic violence, divorce, inheritance and marriage are normally settled within the 'private' sphere of the Afghan extended family without the involvement of local/tribal or state institutions (Wardak 2002a) . They are dealt with on the spot before becoming a 'public' problem, and a burden on other societal institutions. However, those disputes that are considered 'public' are resolved by public institutions at local and tribal levels. The main institution that has traditionally operated as a mechanism of dispute settlement (at village and tribe levels) is jirga/maraka among the Pashtuns and its approximate equivalent -shura 1 -among the non-Pashtuns of Afghanistan (Carter and Conner 1989; Farhadi 2000; Gletzer 1998; Hashemi 2000; Malekyar 2000) .
The term jirga according to the Pashto Descriptive Dictionary (1978 Dictionary ( : 1272 is an original Pashto word, which in its common usage, refers to the gathering of a few or a 10 large number of people; it also means consultation according to this source. The word jirga is also used in Persian/Dari. According to ghyathul-lughat (1871:119) it is derived from jirg, which means a 'wrestling ring', or 'circle', but is commonly used to refer to a gathering of people. Other scholars believe that the word jirga originates from Turkish, where it has a very similar meaning (Faiz-zad 1989: 5) .
Jirga 2
in every day practice refers to a local/tribal institution of decision-making and dispute settlement that incorporates the prevalent local customary law, institutionalised rituals, and a body of village elders whose collective decision about the resolution of a dispute (or local problem) is binding on the parties involved (Wardak 2002b) . Those on the jirga combine 'traditional authority' (based on personal qualities, social status, and leadership skills) as well as 'competent authority' (based on the individual's recognised expertise and skills), which play a central part in achieving a prikra (ruling) that is satisfactory to both parties.
One important form of tribal jirga is nanawate, which means seeking forgiveness/pardon and the obligatory acceptance of a truce offer. This happens when the tribal jirga makes a prikra (decision) that relatives of the par (guilty party) send a 'delegation' to the victim's house. This consists of a group of people that include elders, a female relative of the offender holding a copy of the holy quran, and a mullah (Muslim priest), alongside the offender's other close relatives (and sometimes the offender himself) who bring a sheep and flour to the victim's house. The sheep is often slaughtered at the door of the victim's house. Once inside the house, the delegation seeks pardon on behalf of the offender. As it is against the tribal code of behaviour to reject a nanawate, the victim's relatives pardon the offender and the two parties are reconciled. This reconciliation is called rogha. Thus unlike formal state justice, which often labels offenders as different, evil, and excludes them from the community, nanawate reintegrates them into the community. Existing criminological knowledge suggests that reintegrative social control is, by and large, more effective in reducing crime than disintegrative social control, normally exercised by formal state institutions (Braithwaite 1989 ).
The main reasons that Afghan people have preferred jirga/shura to formal justice is because the former is conducted by respected elders with established social status and 11 the reputation for piety and fairness. In many cases, the disputants personally know the local elders and trust them. In addition, in the context of jirga/shura, elders reach decisions in accordance with accepted local traditions/values (customary law) that are deeply ingrained in the collective conscience of the village/tribe -they have a profound existence in the collective mind of the village and in the minds of its individual members. Also unlike state courts, jirga/shura settle disputes without long delays and without financial costs. Illiteracy plays an important role in discouraging people from using the formal courts -the overwhelming majority of Afghans are unable to make applications, read/understand the laws or complete the paper work.
However jirga/shura has its own problems: in some cases of murder jirga may recommend badal (direct vengeance), or the marriage of a woman from the par's tribe to the victim's close relative. Although these practices have become increasingly rare in recent years (Johnson at al 2003) , the first punishment is in direct conflict with the Afghan state laws, and the second one is a clear violation of fundamental human rights. In addition, jirga/shura is generally a male-only institution; it can also be excessively influenced sometimes by powerful elders. More importantly, in areas where warlords exercise direct control over the population, jirga/shura decisions are influenced (or undermined) by those with guns and money. However, by incorporating jirga/shura into the new justice system, it would conform to the norms of the national legal order of post-war in Afghanistan. This would, in turn, help to make this traditional patriarchal institution more inclusive of both men and women.
But a pre-requisite for all this is a secure social environment where, jirga/shura and the justice system as a whole could operate without any illegitimate influence by warlords. In addition, corrective regimes and rehabilitative programmes for both adult and young offenders do not currently exist in Afghanistan. Although dar -al-ta'adeeb 13 (juvenile correctional institution) is nominally functioning in Kabul, the institution has neither the necessary facilities nor the professional personnel to deal with the serious personal and social problems that Afghan young rule-breakers face today. Thus, the current fragmented Afghan justice 'system' is highly ineffective and dysfunctional; it does not operate as a system at all.
III: Interim Legal
Similarly, the Afghan prison/correction 'service' has only a very basic existence in the main urban centres; it has no existence at all in many rural districts and some These various elements, which currently provide the interim legal framework, are to be used as an important element of post-war justice system in Afghanistan.
IV: Fundamental Principles of Human Rights and Transitional Justice
The past 25 years of war have badly brutalised Afghan society as a whole. During this period, serious abuses of human rights and war crimes (by all sides of the conflict) have taken place. These include massacres, looting of houses and property, rapes, Rights Commission, justice, educational institutions, at local and national levels, is particularly important. As will be discussed later, with the collaboration of Afghan educational and civil society institutions, the justice system can play an important role both in successful investigation of past abuses of human rights and in effective prevention of future violations.
Normative Location of Key Dimensions of Post-war Justice
What has been so far described would seem to indicate that the establishment of a new justice system in post-war Afghanistan is a complex and multi-dimentional as any other nation in the world. There would, however, be a degree of tension/conflict between some aspects of shari'a and jirga/shura and the Western conception of human rights principles. This issue relates to the broader discussion about the 'clash of civilisations' or 'dialogue of civilisations', which is beyond the scope of this paper. However as mentioned earlier, finding solutions to such tension/conflict would be the responsibility of Afghan jami'at -al-ulama assisted and advised by international legal experts in the West and in the Islamic world.
In the current situation, it is the Afghan interim legal framework which is the centre of gravity. Located in the middle of the Afghan normative order, it has the formal authority to act as a medium of communication between the demands of the external and internal dimensions of post-war justice in Afghanistan -between the demands of the moral order of the Afghan society and the requirements of living in an increasingly 'globalised' international community. It is the future popularly approved Afghan constitution and other laws (the 'existing laws' in the interim period) that would define the role and limits of Islamic shari'a within a formal legal framework.
Likewise, informal local/tribal institutions of informal justice would need to be in harmony with the goals of the Afghan national state, its legal order and general principles of human rights. However, no attempt should be made by formal authorities to codify customary law; jirga/shura must continue to function as a genuinely local institution representing local people and their values/interests. This is to ensure that local people have the ownership of the justice system and are able to apply customary laws flexibly in various local contexts within which different conflicts are resolved.
In the same vein, it is also the interim legal framework (and future popularly approved Afghan constitution/other laws) that has the responsibility to define human rights in 
Towards an Integrated Model of a Post-War Justice System
The examination of the key elements of post-war Justice in Afghanistan, above, shows hall. These local officers would replace amer -e-hoquq (law officer) who is closely connected with the formal justice system and has a reputation for corruption.
Jirga/shura would be conducted by around half a dozen elected local elders with expertise in traditional dispute settlement and/or legitimate social influence. The elders would be paid only an honorarium (in form of consultancy fees) and travel expenses; the expenses of hosting jirga/shura would also be paid from the public purse. Although not illustrated in the diagram, above, jirga/shura would also advise the district administrator in issues relating to local governance.
As diagram 2 illustrates the jirga/shura unit would mainly deal with minor criminal, and all types of civil incidents at district level. In the case of civil incidents, people would have the choice to start their cases with either jirga/shura, or with the district court of formal justice. However, all serious criminal cases would be dealt with exclusively by the district court of justice, and those cases that jirga/shura fail to resolve satisfactorily would be referred back to the formal process of the district justice system. The referral would be based on a joint decision by jirga/shura, district judge and the district administrator. While paper work and official procedures must be kept to the minimum, the final prikra (ruling) should be communicated to both the district court of justice and the Human Rights unit to ensure that it is in line with national legal norms and with accepted principles of human rights. In this way, jirga/shura would not only significantly reduce the workload of the court of justice; more importantly, the use of this traditional local/tribal institution of dispute settlement would empower ordinary people to have ownership of the justice processes.
In addition, the processes, rituals and outcome of jirga as a traditional tribal/local The Human Rights unit, on the other hand, would be run by two full-time truly independent, highly educated and well-reputed officials based in well-equipped local offices. In order to counter-balance the male-dominated jirga unit, these officers should mainly be female (as far as practical in the current situation). In the short term, the unit's officials would act as ambassadors of human rights, and their role would be mainly educational. Liasing closely with district level educational institutions, the human rights officials would prepare educational and human rights awareness materials, and disseminate them in culturally sensitive ways. They would also organise lectures and seminars given by leading nationally recognised human rights activists and other Afghan personalities. However, soon after the district Human Rights unit is fully established at the local level, it would have the power to pro-actively investigate serious past human rights abuses and war crimes; it would liase closely with the Independent Afghan Human Rights Commission, compiling serious past human rights abuses and war crimes and reporting them to the Special Court of Human Rights of Afghanistan (or Truth Commission) that Afghanistan would need to establish. The unit would also be the first point of receiving new cases/complaints of human rights abuses, including issues relating to domestic violence (mainly violence against women) and dealing with them in culturally sensitive ways. In addition, the human rights unit would advise the district administrator about local human rights issues, and would have the authority to monitor human rights violations by local government officials as well. It is important to emphasise that the Human Rights unit must be totally independent from the state, warlords and other political factions. Otherwise, it will become an ineffective body, and even an instrument in the hands of those with guns, power and money for staying in positions of power.
The Diagram further illustrates complex interrelationships between the district court of justice, jirga/shura and Human Rights units: as mentioned earlier, while the final prikra (ruling) of jirga/shura should be reported to both the district court of justice and to the Human Rights unit, the latter two would consult the former for its 23 mediatory role in cases that need diversion from the formal justice processes.
Likewise, jirga/maraka and Human Rights units would consult the court of justice about cases that may need to be dealt with in more strictly legalistic ways within the criminal justice system. A positive and constructive interaction between the state and local civil society institutions would provide an integrated inter-agency justice system that is effective, accessible and humane. However, such a system of justice is part and parcel of the processes of democratisation, institutional reform (and building), disarmament, and the establishment of the rule of law in post-war Afghanistan. It can only, therefor, successfully operate in a social and political environment where the rule of law prevails, not the rule of gun and money.
Conclusion
What has been discussed in this paper shows that despite the historical fragmentation and the current devastated state of the Afghan justice system, Afghanistan has a rich legal culture that could partly be used as a basis for rebuilding a new post-war justice system. This legal culture also provides important lessons for Afghans to avoid repeating the mistakes of past rulers of the country who mainly used their systems of justice as an instrument of state control. An unfortunate consequence of this has been the development of justice systems that have been elitist, inaccessible and corrupt, which alienated ordinary people form the state and its formal institutions of justice.
This further resulted in the huge lack of communication between the Afghan state and ordinary people, which further widened the 'culture gap' between cities and rural areas in Afghanistan. Thus, it has not been a coincidence that ordinary people, especially in rural Afghanistan, have traditionally preferred not to use formal justice institutions for the resolution of their disputes.
The integrated model of post-war justice system in Afghanistan proposes inter-institutional co-ordination between the Afghan formal justice system, informal justice, educational, and human rights institutions. It is argued that the incorporation of jirga/shura into the formal justice system would not only simplify the justice process for ordinary people, more importantly it would enable them to have its ownership. This, it is maintained, would make the justice system more widely accessible, cost-effective, and expeditious. Likewise, addressing issues relating to the 24 vast violation of human rights during the past 25 years of brutal war and challenging the existing 'culture of human rights abuses' effectively, need inter-institutional co-ordination. The creation of a truly independent Human Rights unit, and its incorporation into the justice system is an effective way of creating awareness about human rights, accounting for past crimes, and preventing future violations of human rights, More importantly, this inter-institutional interaction between the local justice, executive, educational, and civil society institutions would provide an important channel of communication between the state and ordinary Afghan citizens. This would gradually result in the inclusion of women and those without guns and money into the political, economic and cultural life of the Afghan society. These processes would further pave the way for the gradual replacement of a 'culture of human rights abuses' in Afghan society by a culture of respect for human rights and the rule of law.
Indeed, communication plays an important role in social integration (Habermas 1987) and in strengthening social solidarity (Durkheim 1984) that Afghanistan badly needs today. However in order to test the applicability of this model in the real world, it first needs to be thoroughly discussed among Afghan and international legal experts and ordinary people, at grass root level, and then piloted in selected districts in Afghanistan.
Notes
1 Carter and Connor (1989: 9) operationally define shura in this way: 'A shura is a group of individuals which meets only in response to a specific need in order to decide how to meet the need. In most cases, this need is to resolve a conflict between individuals, families, groups of families, or whole tribes.' This description would seem to indicate that shura and jirga are fundamentally very similar Afghan informal (non-state) mechanisms of conflict resolution that operate in varying social and tribal contexts.
2 Jirga and maraka involve very similar processes and the main constituent elements of the two are not fundamentally different from one another. Therefore, the concepts are often used interchangeably. However, the fact that jirga deals with serious and 25 important conflicts within the tribe (or between tribes) such as murder, disputes over land, mountain, jangle/woods, and the fact that it operates at a higher level of tribal formation, its social organization is more structured. Maraka, on the other hand, mostly deals with civil and relatively less serious criminal matters at local village (or inter-village) level, and therefore, it is loosely structured and its related rituals are not as elaborate as those of a tribal jirga are.
